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Mandatory IFRS adoption and accounting comparability 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The adoption of IFRS by many countries worldwide fuels the expectation 
that financial accounting might become more comparable across countries.  This 
expectation is opposed to an alternative view that stresses the importance of incentives in 
shaping accounting information.  We provide early evidence on this debate by 
investigating the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial 
accounting information around the world.  Our results suggest that while mandatory 
adoption of IFRS increases the comparability of some prominent balance sheet line items 
across countries, it has no clear effect on the cross-country comparability of earnings 
attributes.  To provide a rationale for these mixed findings, we investigate the IFRS 
measurement and disclosure compliance choices for a hand-collected sample of German 
and Italian firms.  We find that predictable country-, region-, and firm-level incentives 
continue to shape the outcome of the financial reporting process and thus limit the cross-
sectional comparability of financial accounting information.  Overall, our results suggest 
that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has a limited impact on accounting comparability 
and that accounting information continues to be shaped by both reporting standards and 
incentives. 
Keywords: international accounting, IFRS, comparability, accounting harmonization, 
earnings attributes, disclosure determinants, accounting incentives 
JEL Classification: M41, G14, F42 3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 
European listed firms in 2005, accompanied by similar regulatory action worldwide, 
represents one of the most influential accounting rule changes in history.  The switch 
from a diverse set of domestic GAAPs to a single common set of accounting standards 
affects thousands of companies that differ in terms of size, ownership structure, capital 
structure, culture, legal environment, among other characteristics (Schipper 2005).  In this 
paper we investigate whether the adoption of harmonized accounting standards has a 
material effect on the comparability of financial accounting information provided by 
firms from different institutional environments.   
European policy makers state that the reason for mandating a common set of 
accounting standards for listed companies is to “level the playing field” for participants in 
the European capital market by increasing the comparability of financial statements 
prepared by publicly traded companies across Europe (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, 
Par. 1).  The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) similarly argues that a 
single set of high quality global accounting standards will provide financial market 
participants with comparable financial statements and thereby help them make economic 
decisions (IASC Foundation, Constitution 2(a)).  Increased cross-country comparability is 
also thought to be the main motivation behind the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) continuing support for convergence and global accounting standards (SEC, 2010) 
and its proposal to require U.S. firms to file their financial reports based on IFRS (SEC, 
2008).  To the extent that mandatory adoption of IFRS successfully levels the playing 
field for market participants by introducing high quality accounting standards across 4 
countries, we should observe two first-order effects: an improvement in financial 
reporting quality (transparency), and an improvement in the cross-sectional comparability 
of financial accounting information (Hail et al. 2009).  
To date, however, the majority of studies on mandatory IFRS adoption primarily 
investigate only one of the two first-order effects above, namely, changes in financial 
reporting quality (see Ahmed et al. 2010; Atwood et al. 2010; Beuselinck et al. 2009; 
Capkun et al. 2008; Garcia et al., 2009; Landsman et al. 2009; Platikanova and Nobes, 
2006), as well as second-order capital market consequences (see Beneish et al. 2009; 
Bruggemann et al. 2009; Daske et al. 2008b; Kosi and Florou 2009; Li 2009; Yu 2009) of 
the IFRS mandate.  Surprisingly little evidence has been produced on the other important 
first-order effect, that is, on changes in cross-country comparability of accounting 
information, even though financial reporting comparability is generally considered by 
policy makers and researchers alike to be vital to investors’ decision making and efficient 
asset allocation.  Thus, to our knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly analyze the 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the cross-country comparability of financial 
accounting information. 
We address our research question using an innovative research design that looks 
at comparability from three different angles.  First, we try to directly observe the impact 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information by 
analyzing changes in the cross-country variance of balance sheet line items caused by the 
IFRS mandate.  Accounting information can be regarded as more comparable across 
countries if subsequent to IFRS adoption firms from similar economic environments but 
different countries exhibit less dispersion in balance sheet line items.  To identify the 5 
impact of IFRS adoption, we apply a difference-in-differences analysis similar to Daske 
et al. (2008b) for a set of 40 non-U.S. countries to control for possible time-invariant 
sample selection bias.  Second, following prior literature that focuses on earnings 
attributes as predominant characteristics of accounting information (Francis et al. 2004), 
we investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on accounting comparability by analyzing the 
within-industry variance of prominent earnings attributes across countries before and 
after the IFRS mandate.  A decrease in the within-industry variance of earnings attributes 
across countries subsequent to IFRS adoption would be taken as evidence of increased 
comparability.  We are able to disentangle the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
cross-country comparability of earnings attributes using the same methodology as for the 
first test. 
Based on our first two analyses, we find mixed evidence on the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability.  While we document robust increases in the 
comparability of provisions (excluding provisions for pensions) and intangible assets 
(excluding goodwill) subsequent to IFRS adoption, we find no evidence of an increase in 
the comparability of reported goodwill measures.  Further, we find no evidence that the 
comparability of earnings attributes is positively affected by mandatory adoption of 
IFRS. 
Our third test aims to shed light on why mandatory adoption of IFRS might have 
only a limited impact on the comparability of financial accounting information.  To 
address this question, we need a high quality firm-level measure of comparability.  We 
employ a set of hand-collected data on the IFRS measurement and disclosure choices of 
German and Italian firms to directly investigate the firm-, region-, and country-level 6 
determinants of accounting information comparability.  Using this sub-sample of 
countries allows us to dive deeper into their institutional determinants.  The selection of 
these two countries is motivated by the following three factors: (a) they share the same 
legal origin (code law), (b) at least one of them has a substantial history of voluntary 
adopters, and (c) they exhibit substantial differences in their respective domestic GAAPs 
prior to IFRS adoption.  Notice that while these two countries share the same legal 
regime and are of roughly the same economic size, and hence from a bird’s eye 
perspective could be considered rather similar, a closer look reveals significant 
differences.  Italy can be described as a relationship-based system rooted in family-run 
small and medium-sized enterprises forming pyramidal groups (Aganin and Volpin 
2003), with low levels of investor protection, high private benefits of control, high 
minority shareholder expropriation risk (Zingales 1994), weak legal enforcement (La 
Porta et al. 1998), highly concentrated ownership (Barca 1995), strong bank orientation, 
and underdeveloped equity markets (La Porta et al. 1997; Pagano et al. 1998).  In 
contrast, over the last two decades Germany has experienced a series of economic 
reforms that have pushed the country more towards an arm’s length economic system 
(Leuz and Wüstemann 2004; Baums and Scott 2005; Gassen and Skaife, 2009).  In short: 
these two countries are reasonably similar in terms of auditing and enforcement, so we 
can expect harmonized standards to have an effect on the comparability of accounting 
information, but they also provide us with a vector of institutional differences that should 
give rise to heterogeneity in incentives. 
The results of our third test provide clear evidence that a lack of financial 
accounting comparability subsequent to IFRS adoption can be explained by domestic 7 
GAAP, as well as by other country-, region-, and firm-level factors.  We interpret this 
evidence as indicating that incentives remain important for shaping accounting 
information even within a set of countries that share a common set of accounting 
standards. 
Taken together, our findings indicate that mandatory adoption of IFRS has only a 
limited impact on the cross-country comparability of financial accounting information.  
This limited effect can be identified only for balance sheet line items, and not for 
earnings attributes.  We propose and test some explanations for the limited effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability.  Studying the disclosure choices of IFRS 
adopting firms, we find that they are driven by incentives at the country, region, and firm 
levels. 
Our paper makes  four distinct contributions to the growing body of literature that 
investigates the effects of IFRS adoption.  First, we extend previous work that focuses on 
the overall quality of IFRS adoption (Joos and Lang 1994; Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; 
Gassen and Sellhorn 2006; Joos and Wysocki 2006; Bradshaw and Miller 2007; 
Christensen et al. 2008; Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Barth et al. 2008; Daske et al., 
2008a, 2008b) by focusing on the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the 
comparability of accounting information.  In particular, we complement the findings of 
Beuselinck et al. (2007), who investigate the comparability of earnings across Europe for 
the period 1990-2005, by looking at the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
accounting comparability using multiple proxies for comparability and analyzing a 
broader set of countries.  Further, we extend concurrent work by Barth et al. (2010), who 
investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on the “value relevance comparability” with U.S. 8 
GAAP firms by using a broader and more robust set of measures to capture 
comparability.  For instance, rather than analyze the co-movement between accounting 
and stock market data, we focus largely on accounting data.  The reason follows from the 
fact that measuring comparability across countries using stock market data as a yardstick 
would require the assumption that stock markets around the globe are equal, and more 
importantly time-invariant, in how they process (accounting) information, and thus a 
research design that tests for changes in accounting comparability based on stock market 
data would result in a joint test of changes in accounting comparability and the validity of 
the above assumption (Holthausen, 2003).  Moreover, our comparability measures aim to 
capture cross-country comparability, while the focus of Barth et al. (2010) is on the 
narrower concept of comparability with U.S. firms. 
Second, we provide additional evidence on the ongoing “standards versus 
incentives” debate in the accounting literature.  Our results show that both forces shape 
accounting information simultaneously, and support the claim of prior studies that 
accounting standards alone are not sufficient to achieve fully comparable accounting 
information. 
Third, by looking at comparability from three different angles (line item-, earnings 
attribute-, and disclosure choice-comparability), we contribute to recent attempts in the 
literature (De Franco et. al. 2009) to specify empirical constructs intended to capture 
comparability from the perspective of financial statement users.  
Fourth, by testing possible determinants of accounting information heterogeneity, 
we extend prior work by providing a possible explanation for the limited comparability 
effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. 9 
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a discussion of 
the related literature.  Section 3 presents our research design, sample, and results.   
Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
II.  RELATED LITERATURE 
Comparability, together with relevance and reliability, is a key qualitative characteristic 
of accounting information.  Comparable financial statements are generally believed to 
facilitate investors’ resource allocation and investment decisions (FASB 1980, 2008; 
IASB 1989, 2008; SEC 2000).  Capital market regulators further believe that a common 
set of accounting standards can lead to improved comparability.  The mandatory adoption 
of IFRS by European listed firms thus aims to enhance comparability (as well as financial 
reporting quality) across European countries by introducing a single set of high quality 
accounting standards (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002).   
However, while comparability of accounting information is considered of 
paramount importance for facilitating investors’ decisions and enhancing efficient asset 
allocation, to date most studies that investigate the mandatory adoption of IFRS  focus on 
either changes in financial reporting quality or capital market consequences rather than 
on changes in cross-country comparability.  Studies that focus on changes in financial 
reporting quality include Ahmed et al. 2010; Atwood et al. 2010; Beuselinck et al. 2009; 
Capkun et al. 2008; Garcia et al., 2009; Landsman et al. 2009; Platikanova and Nobes, 
2006.  Taken together, the studies so far present an ambiguous picture about the quality 
effect of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Among the studies that address the capital market consequences of IFRS 
adoption, Li (2009) shows that the 2005 IFRS mandate by European countries has 10 
reduced firms’ cost of capital only in countries with strong enforcement.  Kosi and Florou 
(2009) look at the debt financing consequences of the IFRS mandate and show that IFRS 
adopters are more likely to issue public rather than private debt.  Studies that look at the 
effects of IFRS on firms’ equity ownership include Yu (2009), who shows that the IFRS 
mandate has increased cross-border equity holdings because of the joint effect of a 
reduction in foreign investors’ information processing costs and a decrease in other 
barriers such as geographic distance, and Bruggemann et al. (2009), who find evidence of 
an increase in individual investors’ trading activity following IFRS adoption.  Finally, 
Beneish et al. (2009) look at the impact of IFRS on countries’ ability to attract foreign 
capital and find no discernible effect for equity investments while they document a 
positive effect on debt investments.   
An attempt to investigate the capital market consequences of IFRS adoption 
through the lens of comparability has been recently carried out by DeFond et al. (2009).  
The idea behind their work is that if IFRS increase comparability and reduce the cost of 
comparing financial statements prepared under different GAAPs, this should positively 
affect U.S. mutual fund holdings in foreign firms.  DeFond et al. (2009) use two input-
based measures that look at the accounting standards followed: the “GAAP heterogeneity 
measure” captures the decrease in accounting standard heterogeneity in a given industry 
as a result of IFRS adoption, and the “GAAP peer measure” is computed as the ratio of 
the number of firms in a given industry using IFRS subsequent to IFRS adoption to the 
number of firms in the same industry applying local GAAP prior to IFRS introduction.  
The authors find that the benefit of increased comparability, in terms of size of mutual 
fund investments, is higher for voluntary than for mandatory adopters; further, for the 11 
latter, discernible effects of improved comparability only obtain in countries with serious 
implementation processes.  A related study that also uses an input-based comparability 
construct based on accounting method choice is Bradshaw et al. (2009).  The authors 
capture comparability as the difference between a firm’s accounting method choices and 
those of its industry peers and find that firms with atypical accounting methods 
experience on average larger analyst forecast errors and increased forecast dispersion. 
Despite the growing literature on mandatory IFRS adoption, to date no published 
study has looked at the direct effect of the adoption on comparability.  A potential reason 
for this gap in the literature may be the lack of established proxies for comparability.  
Indeed, De Franco et al. (2009) recently observe that “The term comparability in 
accounting textbooks, in regulatory pronouncements, and in academic research is 
defined in broad generalities rather than precisely.”  Rather than rely on input-based 
measures of accounting comparability that are related to standards and accounting 
method choices, De Franco et al. (2009) propose two measures of financial statement 
comparability that are firm-specific, output-based, and quantitative that seek to capture 
comparability from the perspective of financial statement users.  The first construct, 
labeled “accounting comparability”, reflects the idea that if the same economic events are 
accounted for homogeneously by two firms (i.e., the two firms show a similar “mapping” 
of economic events into financial statements), the two firms should have comparable 
accounting systems.  Empirically, the authors proxy for economic events and the output 
of financial statements using stock returns and earnings, respectively; the more similar 
the mapping between earnings and returns across firms, the more comparable the 
accounting systems.  The second construct proposed by De Franco et al. (2009), labeled 12 
“earnings comparability”, is based on the co-movement of earnings across firms.  The 
idea is that firms with correlated economic events and similar mappings of these events 
will in turn exhibit correlated earnings over time. 
A few working papers explicitly investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on 
accounting comparability.  Beuselinck et al. (2007) investigate the comparability of 
earnings across a sample of European companies over the period 1990 to 2005.   
Measuring earnings comparability using the relation between accruals and cash flows, 
they generally find increasing earnings comparability over time, while when they look 
only at 2005 they fail to document a clear and significant impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on earnings comparability.   
Following the output-based approach proposed by De Franco et al. (2009), in 
concurrent work Barth et al. (2010) investigate whether the adoption of IFRS by non-U.S. 
firms increases the comparability of accounting information with respect to U.S. firms 
applying U.S. GAAP.  The authors operationalize comparability by looking at both 
“accounting system comparability” and “value relevance comparability.”  Accounting 
system comparability is measured as the difference between predicted stock returns based 
on U.S. GAAP and IFRS pricing multiples: the lower the difference in predicted returns, 
the higher the level of comparability.  Value relevance comparability looks at differences 
in the value relevance of earnings between U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms: an increase in the 
homogeneity of value relevance levels subsequent to IFRS introduction indicates higher 
comparability.  The authors document that following IFRS adoption, IFRS firms and U.S. 
GAAP firms exhibit higher accounting system and value relevance comparability 
although some differences still persist. 13 
In sum, most of the studies on IFRS adoption focus on accounting quality issues 
or second order capital market consequences while the evidence on the important first 
order effect of comparability appears surprisingly scant.  Our study aims at filling this 
gap by studying the mandatory IFRS adoption effects on the cross-country comparability 
of accounting information and by testing for potential cross-sectional determinants of this 
comparability. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Research Design 
This paper investigates whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS has an economically and 
statistically significant impact on the comparability of financial accounting information 
across the world.  We use three different tests to provide evidence on our research 
question.   
Our view of accounting comparability is similar to that in De Franco et al. (2009).  
Financial accounting outcomes are regarded as being perfectly comparable whenever 
firms that face the same economic events provide the same financial accounting 
information.  Firms facing similar economic events (hereafter “economically similar 
firms”) should therefore report similar financial accounting information.  Thus, the 
observed variance in financial accounting information across economically similar firms 
can be traced backed conceptually to two different sources: variance in the economic 
events these firms face and less than perfect accounting comparability.   
Our first two tests are designed to investigate systematic changes in the variance 
of financial accounting outcomes over time.  An important assumption underlying these 
tests is that the variance of the economic events that firms face does not change over 14 
time;  our test design controls for potential violations of this assumption.  The first two 
tests are based on large samples of firm-year observations from 40 countries, which 
include 22 IFRS adopting as well as 18 non-adopting countries.
1  We refer to these two 
groups of countries as “country clusters”, that is, we refer to a cluster of IFRS adopting 
countries and a cluster of non-adopting countries.  The IFRS adopting countries adopt 
IFRS in 2005, while the non-adopting countries do not adopt IFRS during the sample 
period.  The non-adopting countries allow us to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption 
using a difference-in-differences research design similar to the Daske et al. (2008b) 
approach.  The sample covers the 1998 to 2008 period, but we delete observations 
pertaining to 2005 to remove adoption year effects.  To measure the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the comparability of financial accounting information, we need to assess the 
variance of financial accounting information (i.e., line items, earnings attributes) for a set 
of economically similar firms.  We therefore pool firms within each cluster (IFRS 
adopters and non-adopters) across countries into sub-samples (hereafter “bins”).  Our 
dependent variable is thus given as the standard deviation of our financial accounting 
information measures within these bins.  Our analyses, which are based on multivariate 
models that include bin-attribute fixed effects and a set of control variables, test whether 
the variance of financial accounting information subsequent to 2005 for the cluster of 
IFRS adopting countries exhibits a decrease (higher comparability) after controlling for 
                                                 
1  Grouping countries into IFRS adopting and non-IFRS adopting countries is not a trivial task as some 
countries (e.g., Hong Kong, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, and Singapore) have adopted a 
modified version of IFRS or follow piece-wise adoption strategies.  In our paper we follow the 
classification of Daske et al. (2008b) with the exception of Peru, which we classify as an IFRS 
adopting country.  Classifying Peru as non-adopting would effectively reduce the post-2005 sample 
size of Peru to zero as nearly every Peruvian firm is classified by Worldscope as applying IFRS 
subsequent to 2005.  Our results are virtually unaffected by this design choice.  Also, note that 
although Hong Kong has the status of Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China, for the sake of expositional simplicity we refer to Hong Kong as a country throughout the 
paper. 15 
contemporaneous changes in the variance of financial accounting information for the 
cluster of non-adopting countries.  
In our first test we estimate the impact of IFRS adoption on the within-cluster 
variance of three prominent balance sheet line items: goodwill, other intangibles, and 
provisions (excluding provisions for employee benefits).  To identify economically 
similar firms, we construct our bins based on cluster, industry, size (as measured by 
quintiles of total assets), and year.  For each bin, the standard deviation of the line item 
under study is our dependent variable.  Multivariate tests that include industry and size 
fixed effects, as well as additional control variables that proxy for potentially changing 
heterogeneity in the operating and financial environment of the bin’s firms, allow us to 
isolate the treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the within-cluster variance of 
balance sheet line items. 
The second test follows a similar design, but instead of balance sheet line items it 
uses a set of earnings attributes that we interpret as prominent summary characteristics of 
financial accounting information.  In particular, following Francis et al. (2004) we 
investigate the accounting-based measures accrual quality, predictability, persistence, and 
earnings smoothness as well as the capital market-based attributes conservatism, 
timeliness, and value relevance.
2  As all of these measures are sample attributes, we 
calculate them following a cross-sectional approach.  We first define a bin by country, 
industry, and year (at least 10 observations are required for each bin), which yields up to 
1,902 earnings attribute measures that can be classified by country, industry, and year.  
Then, for each measure, we construct bins by cluster, industry, and year and calculate the 
within-cluster variance for each industry and year. These within-cluster variances of 
                                                 
2  Details of the earnings attribute calculation process can be found in Appendix 1. 16 
earnings attributes, which are measured at the industry, year, and cluster level, represent 
our dependent variables of interest.  Again, we use a multivariate test design to identify 
the treatment effect of IFRS adoption. 
In the third set of tests, we turn our focus to the degree to which adopting firms 
comply with IFRS, and the determinants of any differences in compliance across firms 
and countries.  To do so, we use a hand-collected sample of accounting and disclosure 
compliance data of German and Italian IFRS adopting firms to assess comparability at the 
firm level.  While our first two tests are based on large cross-country samples and 
therefore to some extent sacrifice internal validity for external validity, this “boutique” 
sample allows us to measure financial accounting information and comparability with 
higher precision and to unambiguously link this information to the effect of IFRS 
adoption, leading to a high level of internal validity.  Full comparability would imply the 
same compliance levels across firms.  We therefore regard the degree of compliance as an 
additional dimension of accounting information comparability.  Using a classification 
instrument discussed in Appendix 2, we find significant differences in IFRS measurement 
and disclosure compliance across German and Italian firms’ 2006 annual reports.  Since 
we are able to measures differences in incentives at the firm level, we are able to 
investigate for our sample of IFRS applying firms whether firm-, region- and country-
level incentives explain the differences in disclosure compliance that we document. 
Sample Selection  
Our first two sets of tests focus on non-financial publicly traded firms from 40 different 
countries and cover the period 1998 to 2008 (excluding 2005).  The sample selection 
starts with all firms in the Worldscope universe of countries that have more than 100 17 
public firms followed by Worldscope.  From this initial sample, we delete all firm-year 
observations that correspond to voluntarily IFRS adoption; all of our findings are thus 
based on mandatory adopters.  We further delete firm-year observations for which returns 
data from Datastream are not available, or for which any other data necessary for 
estimating the line item tests (the line item sample) or earnings attributes tests (the 
earnings attribute sample) are absent.  This procedure yields a sample of 31,582 firm-
year observations for the line item tests and 138,199 firm-year observations for the 
earnings attributes tests.  The reduced sample size for the line item tests is due to 
Worldscope not providing detailed coverage for smaller and less visible firms in their 
universe.  The results for the line item tests are therefore likely to be biased towards more 
visible and larger firms.  Note that we do not include U.S. data among our sample 
observations, as we do not have access to Worldscope data for U.S. firms, merging 
Compustat and Worldscope data is likely to be problematic where special data items are 
concerned, and we want to mitigate the possibility that our non-adopting control group is 
dominated by U.S. observations.  Descriptive statistics for both samples can be found in 
Panel A of Table 1 (line items sample) and Panel A of Table 2 (earnings attribute 
sample).
3 
Our last set of tests requires hand collection of financial reporting and governance 
data.  Given our interest in identifying country- and firm-level determinants of 
comparability while balancing the data collection costs, we study a sub-sample of 
German and Italian firms.  The sample comprises all Italian IFRS adopters and all 
German late adopters as well as a matched sample of German firms.  The total sample 
                                                 
3  Our samples are unbalanced panels. Robustness analyses based on balanced panels (not tabulated) 
show that our findings are not affected qualitatively by this design choice. 18 
size is 405 observations.  Further details about this sample selection procedure are 
provided in the results section. 
Balance Sheet Line Item Tests 
To measure the impact of harmonized accounting standards on accounting comparability, 
our first set of tests investigates financial accounting outcomes that are expected to be 
directly affected by accounting standards: balance sheet line items.  As accounting 
standards regulate recognition and measurement issues, we expect that our first sets of 
tests maximize identification of an IFRS treatment effect on accounting comparability.   
More specifically, we study the variance of goodwill, other intangible assets, and 
provisions (excluding provisions for employee benefits), each measured as percentage of 
total assets, across country clusters (cluster of IFRS adopting countries and cluster of 
non-adopting countries) before and after IFRS adoption.  We select these three line items 
because (a) their measurement is based on both standards guidance as well as managerial 
judgment, (b) standards guidance for their recognition and measurement exhibits material 
heterogeneity across local GAAP regimes, and (c) data for these line items is available 
from Worldscope. 
Accounting for intangibles is likely one of the major changes in financial 
reporting for countries that adopt IFRS.  Under IAS 38, a firm has to recognize intangible 
assets (both in the case of purchased and internally generated assets) if it is likely that 
these assets will provide distinguishable future economic benefits to the firm and their 
cost can be reliably estimated.  IFRS 3 requires the capitalization of goodwill acquired in 
a business combination, but does not permit the recognition of internally generated 
goodwill.  In the process of purchase price allocation, IFRS also mandates the recognition 19 
of a wide variety of intangibles (such as computer software, patents, copyrights, customer 
and supplier relationships, etc.) whose capitalization is commonly prohibited under local 
GAAP in many jurisdictions. 
As in the case of intangibles, accounting for provisions is also likely to represent a 
significant change for a large number of countries adopting IFRS.  According to IAS 37, 
a firm must recognize a provision if a present obligation arises as a result of a past event, 
if payment is probable, and if the amount can be reliably estimated.  Compared to IAS 37, 
many local GAAP regimes’ rules imply a broader opportunity for provision recognition, 
no requirement in terms of discounting, and the possibility of recognizing provisions even 
before an actual obligation to a third party arises.  All standards (IAS 37, IAS 38, and 
IFRS 3) that are relevant for our line items under study offer additional guidance that 
aims to ensure homogenous application of the standards in practice. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Based on the above discussion, we expect firms from countries in the IFRS adopting 
cluster to exhibit on average lower cross-country variances for goodwill, other 
intangibles, as well as provisions after IFRS adoption, since adoption of IFRS leads these 
firms to share common guidance on the recognition and measurement of these items.  
Table 1, Panel B reports the standard deviation of our balance sheet line items partitioned 
by country cluster (IFRS adopting versus non-adopting) and period (pre- versus post-
2005).  The average standard deviation of each partition is calculated for bins formed by 
industry, size (as measured by quintiles of total assets), and year.  GOODWILL captures 
the total amount of goodwill recognized on the balance sheet, OTH_INTASS captures 
intangible assets net of goodwill recognized on the balance sheet, and PROVISIONS 20 
captures provisions net of provisions for employee benefits as recognized on the balance 
sheet;  all measures are deflated by total assets.  Asterisks indicate significant differences 
in mean or median values of our dependent variables across the pre-2005 and post-2005 
periods.  Inverted triangles report significant differences across country clusters (both 
before and after 2005).  It can be seen from the results that the cross-country variance of 
balance sheet line items changes significantly across the pre- and post-2005 periods.   
Further, the magnitude of the variance tends to differ across clusters, both before and 
after 2005.   For firms in the non-adopting cluster, both GOODWILL and OTH_INTASS 
experience an increase in line item variance after 2005.  For firms in the IFRS adopting 
cluster, however, only GOODWILL experiences an increase in variance after 2005; the 
variance of OTH_INTASS remains stable across periods and the variance of 
PROVISIONS declines.  Taken together, these results provide preliminary evidence that 
adopting IFRS standards dampens the cross-country variance of provisions. 
While one can interpret the univariate findings presented in Panel B as 
preliminary evidence on the effect of adopting IFRS standards on the cross-country 
variance of our balance sheet line items, to isolate the effect of IFRS adoption we need to 
control for the overall time trend and other potential determinants of the reported 
magnitudes of our balance sheet items.  Panel C of Table 1 reports the results of two 
multivariate models that include such controls.  In particular, we estimate the following 
two models for each of our balance sheet line items: 
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where LINEITEM is GOODWILL, OTH_INTASS, or PROVISIONS, respectively, deflated by 
total assets.  The subscripts k, j, q, i, and t denote cluster, industry, size quintile, firm, and year, 
respectively.  INDDUMMY is a set of industry fixed effects.  SIZE is a set of size quintile fixed 
effects, where size is measured by total assets.  IFRS_ADOPT is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for observations that correspond to the cluster of IFRS adopting countries.   
POST_2005 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for observations subsequent to 2005. 
 indicates the arithmetic mean of  for the sample indicated by the subscript of   
indicates the standard deviation of for the sample indicated by the subscript of   ROA is 
return on assets, calculated by dividing earnings before interest and taxes by beginning-of-fiscal 
year total assets.  MTB is market capitalization divided by book value of equity.  LEVERAGE is 
total debt divided by total assets.  FREQ_LOSSES is the frequency of losses, defined as the 
proportion of the previous five fiscal years in which the firm reported negative earnings.   
Since our main independent variables are defined across cluster and time only, in models 
(1) and (2) above we control for industry and size quintile effects by including industry 
and size fixed effects.  However, as discussed above, an assumption underlying our 
analysis is that factors (besides the applied accounting standards) that affect the variance 
of financial accounting information are time-invariant.  To address the possibility that this 
assumption might be violated, in model (2) we also include a set of control variables that 
potentially influence the variance of balance sheet line items.  Because, to our 
knowledge, prior literature provides no guidance on the determinants of the variance of 
accounting line items across samples, we select a set of control variables that broadly 
tries to capture the operating and financial environment of our sample firms.  Since the 
observational unit of our tests is at the cluster, industry, size quintile, and year level, we 
include the respective level arithmetic means as well as the standard deviations of our 
control variables in model (2).  By including these additional controls in model (2) but 22 
not in model (1), we are able to shed light on how our findings are affected by these 
additional control variables. 
In identifying proxies for firms’ operating and financial environment, we draw in 
part from prior literatures on the determinants of earnings attributes (Dechow and Dichev 
2002) and on the recognition of intangible assets (Wyatt 2005; Markarian et al. 2008), 
and include accounting profitability, market-to-book, leverage, and the frequency of 
previous fiscal years’ losses.  Accounting profitability measures operating profitability as 
well as operating risk.  Similarly, market-to-book can be viewed as a proxy for growth 
options or alternatively financial distress.  Under the theory of efficient capital structure 
choice, low leverage indicates high risk, whereas under the pecking order theory of 
capital structure choice, high leverage indicates financial distress.  The frequency of 
previous fiscal years’ losses is a direct indicator of financial distress.  Due to these 
control variables’ nature as “additional” controls, we do not make predictions as to their 
sign, nor do we discuss their results below. 
The results of our multivariate tests using balance sheet line items as our 
dependent variables are reported in Table 1, Panel C and indicate that our univariate 
results from Panel B are not driven by unobserved determinants.  Our main variable of 
interest, the interaction of IFRS_ADOPT and POST_2005, is significantly negative for 
provisions and other intangibles, indicating that firms in IFRS adopting countries 
experience a significant decline in the variance of these balance sheet line items 
subsequent to 2005, relative to both the pre-2005 period and the non-adopting control 
group.  We do not find a comparable effect for goodwill.  The null result for goodwill 
makes intuitive sense: purchase price allocation and the associated IFRS accounting 23 
guidance have been criticized as giving arbitrary discretion to management (Ramanna 
and Watts, 2007), and as such it is not surprising that the guidance does not necessarily 
produce more comparable financial accounting values.  These results remain stable across 
model specifications.  Also, the R² statistics indicate reasonable model fit, which is driven 
to a large extent by the fixed effect components of our models.  Taken together, the 
multivariate results in Panel C are consistent with a positive impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on the comparability of balance sheet line items across IFRS adopting firms.   
Earnings Attribute Tests 
While balance sheet line items can be expected to be directly influenced to some extent 
by (changes in) accounting standards, the effect on the central summary measure of 
accounting performance, namely, earnings, and its attributes is far less obvious.  Prior 
research (Francis et al. 2004) documents that earnings attributes are priced measures of 
accounting information.  It is still an open question, however, as to whether these 
attributes can unambiguously be linked to earnings or, more broadly, accounting quality.  
In this paper we do not take a stand on whether or how earnings attributes are related to 
earnings quality.  Rather, we simply take earnings attributes to be financial accounting 
outcomes that can be used to assess the comparability of accounting information (similar 
to Beuselinck et al. 2007; De Franco et al. 2009; Barth et al. 2010).  If the cross-country 
variance of within-industry earnings attributes declines after 2005 for firms in the IFRS 
adopting cluster (controlling for contemporaneous changes in the variance of earnings 
attributes for firms in the non-adopting cluster), this finding would indicate an 
improvement in accounting comparability following the IFRS mandate.  24 
To identify a set of earnings attributes suitable for conducting our tests, we closely 
follow Francis et al. (2004) and use the following seven attributes: accrual quality, 
persistence, predictability, smoothness, timeliness, conservatism, and value relevance.   
As we have only three consecutive years of IFRS observations (2006 to 2008), we cannot 
estimate firm-specific time-series measures of our earnings attributes.  We thus estimate 
our earnings attributes cross-sectionally.  We partition the earnings attribute sample into 
bins defined by country, industry, and year.  Industry classifications are based on the first 
digit of firms’ Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
4  For each bin, we require at 
least ten observations so as to have sufficient data to estimate the earnings attributes 
measures (see Appendix 1).  All measures are coded such that higher values indicate 
more pronounced attributes (e.g., greater smoothness, longer persistence, higher accrual 
quality). 
To the extent that IFRS adoption affects the variance of earnings attributes across 
countries, we expect a change across the pre- and post-2005 periods for firms in the IFRS 
adopting cluster.  If firms in the non-adopting cluster experience a similar effect, this 
would highlight a need to control for other time trends using a difference-in-differences 
design.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2, Panel B reports the within-industry and -year standard deviation of our earnings 
attribute measures across countries partitioned by cluster and by period.  Again, asterisks 
highlight significant differences across pre- and post-2005 periods in the mean and 
median values of our dependent variables.  Inverted triangles indicate significant 
                                                 
4   Our results are not sensitive to this design choice. Additional analyses (not tabulated) in which we 
group firms according to two-digit SIC codes render similar results. 25 
differences across country clusters (both before and after 2005).  It can be seen from the 
results that there is no discernible time trend in the variance of earnings attributes across 
countries.  For IFRS adopting countries, the variance decreases significantly for two of 
the seven measures (persistence and smoothness) while it increases significantly for three 
measures (accrual quality, predictability, and timeliness).  For non-adopting countries, the 
variance decreases significantly for three of the seven measures (persistence, smoothness, 
timeliness) while it increases for one measure (predictability).  Significant differences 
across country clusters are generally rare.  In the pre-2005 period, firms in the IFRS 
adopting cluster appear to have significantly more heterogeneous accrual quality, while in 
the post-2005 period they have less heterogeneous predictability and more heterogeneous 
timeliness compared to their non-adopting counterparts.  Taken together, the univariate 
analysis exhibits no clear effect of IFRS adoption on the within-industry variance of 
earnings attributes across countries.   
In Table 2, Panel C we present results of multivariate analyses that are similar to 
those for the line items tests.  As before, we estimate two multivariate models:  
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where EARATT is AQ, PERS, PRED, SMOOTH, TIME, CONS, VR, or EA_ALL.  The first 
seven measures stand for accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, timeliness, 
conservatism, and value relevance, respectively.  These measures are calculated following the 
method detailed in Appendix 1.  EA_ALL represents a variable containing the standard 
deviations of all earnings attributes, yielding multiple observations for each bin (one for each 
attribute available).  When the models are estimated for EA_ALL, an additional fixed effect 26 
indicating the type of earnings attribute is included in the models.  All other variables are as 
defined for models (1) and (2) above. 
Also as before, while model (3) captures the treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
without controlling for alternative time-variant sample factors that might impact the 
variance of earnings attributes, model (4) includes the same set of additional control 
variables as in model (2) for the line items test to control for the operating and financial 
environment of the sample firms. 
Focusing attention on the interaction between IFRS_ADOP and POST_2005, 
which isolates the treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the variance of the 
earnings attributes across countries within each cluster, we find that across the seven 
earnings attributes the only one to take a significant coefficient in both models is 
timeliness.  In this case 3 loads significantly positive, indicating that mandatory adoption 
of IFRS led to an increase in variance across countries, which is consistent with a 
decrease in comparability.  We also find a negative and significant coefficient on 3 for 
predictability in model (4), but we refrain from drawing conclusions from this finding as 
it does not appear in model (3).  When we run the models using EA_ALL, which includes 
all earnings attributes’ standard deviations together with differentiating fixed effects, we 
find no clear treatment effect of mandatory IFRS adoption.   
Taken together, the results of our first two sets of tests suggest that while 
mandatory IFRS adoption has increased the comparability of some balance sheet line 
items, it has not increased the comparability of earnings attributes (at least during our 
sample period).  Our third set of tests, which we turn to next, aims to shed some light on 
why the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on the comparability of financial accounting 
information might be limited. 27 
Measurement and Disclosure Compliance Tests 
In our prior tests, we find mixed evidence on the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
accounting comparability: while we document increased comparability of some balance 
sheet line items, we find no clear effect for earnings attributes.  In this section we conduct 
a series of tests that investigate the cross-country comparability of accounting 
measurement and disclosure compliance.  We argue that the comparability of financial 
accounting information increases with the level of measurement and disclosure 
compliance – if every firm were to fully comply with all relevant rules and regulations, 
different firms’ accounting outcomes should be highly comparable, provided that the 
accounting regulation does not impose artificial barriers to cross-sectional comparability.  
Accordingly, we take compliance as a firm-level proxy for comparability. 
Using a unique data set on the 2006 accounting measurement and disclosure 
compliance of German and Italian firms that are publicly listed since at least 2004 and 
that adopted IFRS in 2005 (so-called “late adopters”), we first investigate whether there 
are significant differences in accounting measurement and disclosure compliance across 
countries for these firms.  To do so, we hand-collect accounting measurement and 
disclosure compliance data from the group financial reports of all firms that meet our data 
requirements (136 German and 153 Italian firms).  Financial reports for the fiscal year 
2006 are either downloaded from the respective stock exchange website or the respective 
firm investor relation website, while governance data are manually retrieved from the 
Italian market regulator’s (CONSOB) website and corporate governance reports for 
Italian firms and from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange website and financial reports for 
German firms.  From the 2006 financial reports of these firms, we hand-collect 28 
accounting measurement and disclosure compliance data.  To mitigate possible sample 
selection issues, we also collect compliance data from the group financial reports of 
German early adopters, so as to replicate our analysis by comparing the Italian firms with 
a matched sample of 153 German firms (116 of which early adopters).
5  Details on the 
instrument used to collect the data are presented in Appendix 2. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents results on accounting measurement compliance in Panel A and 
disclosure compliance in Panel B.  In Panel A, we report stated accounting measurement 
compliance separately for German late adopters, German matched firms, and Italian firms 
for the following IFRS standards: IFRS 2 (Share-based Payment), IAS 11 (Construction 
Contracts), IAS 17 (Leases), IAS 19 (Employee Benefits), IAS 36 (Impairment of 
Assets), IAS 38 (Intangible Assets), and IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement).  While we generally find the stated accounting measurement compliance 
to be similarly high across countries, we find significant differences with respect to IAS 
38 and IAS 39, with German late adopters showing lower compliance than Italian firms.  
Looking more closely at the detailed response data (not tabulated), we find that German 
firms tend to expense development costs more often, while they tend not to recognize the 
fair value of derivative financial instruments on their balance sheets.  Because these non-
complying measurement choices are both in line with local German GAAP, we conclude 
that some of the German late adopters “bend” IFRS rules towards local German GAAP.  
We find a similar result for the German matched sample, although with a somewhat 
                                                 
5  To match German firms to similar Italian firms, we use a propensity score matching procedure and the 
following logit model: 
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lower level of significance.  In contrast, the German matched firms exhibit a higher level 
of IFRS 2 measurement compliance than Italian firms. 
In Panel B, we report disclosure compliance scores separately for German late 
adopters, German matched firms, and Italian firms for the same standards as in Panel A 
as well as for IAS 33 (Earnings Per Share).  Comparing the disclosure compliance scores 
with the accounting measurement compliance scores, we find that disclosure compliance 
is significantly lower than measurement compliance (this finding is in line with prior 
literature; see, e.g., Street and Gray, 2001).  Further, we find much more cross-country 
variance in disclosure compliance.  This variance does not lean towards one country, 
however: Italian firms exhibit significantly higher disclosure compliance for IFRS 2, IAS 
33, IAS 36 and IAS 39, while German late adopters score significantly better for IAS 17 
and IAS 38.  A comparison with the German matched sample provides similar results 
except that Italian firms’ higher scores for IAS 33 and IAS 36 are not significant and the 
German matched firms show higher disclosure compliance for IAS 11. 
Following arguments in prior literature, the overall lower level of disclosure 
compliance is likely explained by the (perceived) lower level of disclosure enforcement 
by auditors and regulatory bodies (Hope, 2003).  The results on disclosure compliance for 
IAS 38, which indicate that German firms display greater compliance than Italian firms, 
may due to German firms providing additional disclosures to compensate for lower 
measurement compliance (given their reluctance to recognize development costs).  Other 
observed cross-country differences in disclosure behavior might be explained by the 
tendency of firms to stick to established disclosure behavior based on local GAAP.  Also, 
when comparing German late adopters with Italian late adopters, one has to bear in mind 30 
that German firms faced lower transaction costs for early IFRS adoption.  This implies 
that German late adopters more actively self-selected into not adopting IFRS early 
compared to Italian firms.  As IFRS has been argued to demand an increase in disclosures 
relative to most local GAAPs (Daske et al., 2008a), we can expect our sample of German 
firms to be more reluctant to comply with disclosure regulations than an average German 
public firm.  Evidence from the matched sample comparison is consistent with this idea. 
We conclude from the 2006 IFRS compliance tests that, even under harmonized 
accounting standards, accounting information continues to be heterogeneous.  In 
particular, we identify some variation in accounting measurement compliance, as well as 
more pronounced variation in disclosure compliance, across countries.  When we 
examine the standard deviation of our compliance figures, we additionally find that 
disclosure compliance exhibits significant within-country dispersion.  
To investigate the within-country variance of disclosure compliance, which we 
interpret as evidence of limited accounting information comparability, our last test 
examines the determinants of disclosure compliance within each country.  We perform 
both a within-country and a pooled-sample analysis on our German and Italian data.   
To construct our dependent variable, DSCORE, we average all disclosure scores 
for the 252 German (136 late adopters and the 116 early adopters studied in the prior 
analysis) and 153 Italian firms.  We estimate country sample and interacted pooled 
sample versions of the following disclosure compliance determinant model:
6 
                                                 
6  To address possible omitted variable concerns, we also estimated alternative versions of this model 
that included leverage, index membership, number of years since the initial public offering, seasoned 
public offerings (SPO), American Depositary Receipts (ADR), foreign listing, foreign sales, and 
analyst following as additional independent variables.  These additional variables do not change our 
inferences. 31 
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where DSCORE is average disclosure compliance, calculated using the instrument presented in 
Appendix 2.  The subscripts i, and j denote firm, and industry.  INDDUMMY is a set of first-digit 
SIC industry dummy variables.  TOTASS is total assets.  ROA, MTB, and FREQ_LOSSES are as 
defined before.  %INDEP_BOARD_D is a dummy variable for board independence that for the 
Italian sample is coded one if the number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
board members is above the mean and zero otherwise, and for the German sample is coded one if 
the head of the supervisory board was not the former chief executive officer of the respective firm 
and zero otherwise.  INSTOWN is a dummy variable indicating significant institutional 
ownership in the firm.  GOVOWN is a dummy variable indicating whether an Italian 
governmental body has a stake in the firm.  FAMBUS is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm is controlled by a managing family.  BIG4 is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s 
financial statements have been audited by a dominant audit supplier (PWC, KPMG, Deloitte, or 
Ernst & Young).  LD_REGION is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective German 
(Italian firm) is domiciled in the eastern regions of Germany (southern regions of Italy).  EARLY 
is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is an early or late IFRS adopter. 
Industry, size (log(TOTASS)), profitability (ROA), growth (MTB), and frequency of 
losses (FREQ_LOSSES) are included following prior literature (see Healy and Palepu 
2001) to account for the operating environment and financing needs of the sample firms.  
Firms facing greater operating uncertainty and financing needs are likely to face greater 
incentives to disclose more (so as to reduce external capital providers’ information 
asymmetry), and thus we expect positive signs on growth and frequency of losses.  In 
addition, because larger firms are more visible, they are likely to face greater public 
demand for disclosure, so we expect a positive coefficient on size.  High profitability 
predicts a rich investment opportunity set, and as such greater external financing needs 
and hence incentives for more disclosures, but it also predicts increased competition by 
rivals, and thus increased costs of disclosure (Prencipe 2004).  We therefore make no 
prediction for the sign on profitability. 32 
Next, we include in the model %INDEP_BOARD_D to capture firm governance.  
Generally, outside members on the board are regarded to be a sign of good governance 
(Anderson et al. 2004).  For Italy, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) provide empirical evidence 
for a sample of firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange that voluntary disclosure is 
positively associated with the percentage of independent board members in companies 
where a dominant shareholder exists.  As we state above, we proxy for board 
independence using a dummy variable that for the Italian sample is coded one if the 
number of independent directors divided by the total number of board members is above 
the mean and zero otherwise, and for the German sample is coded one if the head of the 
supervisory board was not the former chief executive officer of the respective firm and 
zero otherwise.  The reason for the different basis for measuring board independence is 
due to the fact that, in Germany, the Corporate Governance Code (Kodex) does not 
mandate information disclosure on directors’ independence, and thus we take the 
presence of a “CEO insider” to be indicative of low board independence.  For both 
countries, we expect a positive relation between %INDEP_BOARD_D and DSCORE.   
The variables INSTOWN, GOVOWN, and FAMBUS are included in the model to 
capture the ownership structure of the firm.  As market-based governance is assumed to 
be weakly developed in Italy (Pagano and Volpin 2005), and not as strong as for Anglo-
Saxon countries in Germany (La Porta et al. 2000), institutional ownership is assumed to 
have an overall positive effect on governance (Gillan and Starks 2003).  On the other 
hand, whether institutional owners need public disclosure to fulfill their governance role 
is an open question.  Following the entrenchment argument (Fan and Wong 2002), it 
seems possible that institutional owners collaborate with management in withholding 33 
information from outside stakeholders.  A very similar argument applies to governmental 
ownership (Wang and Wong 2008).  Thus, we make no prediction on the signs for 
INSTOWN and GOVOWN.  Family-run businesses have an important role both in 
Germany (Klein, 2000) and in Italy (Aganin and Volpin 2003).  As family-controlled 
enterprises generally face lower demands for public disclosure of financial accounting 
information, we expect a negative coefficient on FAMBUS.  This prediction is in line 
with previous literature that shows family firms have a tendency to disclose less because 
of better monitoring of management, a longer investment horizon, and better access to 
inside information for owners (Chen et al. 2008). 
Of course, disclosure compliance is also a matter of external enforcement.  While 
regulatory enforcement is the same for publicly listed German and Italian firms, 
enforcement by external audits is subject to dispersion of audit quality.  In line with prior 
literature (DeAngelo 1981), we expect the Big4 audit firms to provide higher audit 
quality and hence greater disclosure compliance enforcement.  Thus, we expect a positive 
relation between BIG4 and DSCORE. 
Our next potential determinant of interest is LD_REGION.  The Italian business 
environment has been documented to be geographically diverse (Gerschenkron 1955; 
Eckaus 1961; Terrasi 1999).  In general, the informal institutions that shape the 
governance environment of Italian society are very different between the northern, 
central, and southern regions of Italy.  Especially in the South, informal governance 
institutions are influential and can be expected to reduce the demand for formal 
disclosure compliance.  A similar rationale applies to Germany where, subsequent to 
reunification, a lack of convergence between the less developed East and the more 34 
industrialized West led to considerable disparity in the levels of income, investment, and 
productivity (Boltho et al. 1999).  Thus, we expect both countries to exhibit a negative 
coefficient on LD_REGION. 
Finally, we expect German early adopters to exhibit a higher level of disclosure 
compliance compared to late adopters as a result of a learning curve effect.  Hence, we 
predict a positive sign on EARLY.  A significant positive relation between EARLY and 
DSCORE may also arise, however, due to omitted variables that drive the incentive for 
early adoption as well as the incentive to provide more disclosure. 
Descriptive statistics for the potential determinants of differences in disclosure 
compliance as well as the control variables are presented in Panel A of Table 4.  Panel B 
of Table 4 reports correlations among the dependent and independent variables and thus 
provides univariate results.  Disclosure compliance for Italian firms is significantly 
positively related with size, growth, audit quality, and southern origin.  In addition, it is 
positively related to profitability and institutional ownership.  These results can be 
interpreted as indicating that in Italy, easier access to external financing outweighs 
proprietary cost arguments and institutional owners increase the demand for public 
disclosure.  For the German sample, disclosure compliance is significantly positively 
associated with size, independent board members, audit quality, and early IFRS adoption.  
The correlations between dependent variables are generally low to moderate with the 
exemption of FAMBUS and GOVOWN, which have a correlation of -0.490.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4, Panel C presents the multivariate results of model (5).  For the Italian sample, all 
model coefficients except that on FAMBUS are in the predicted direction, and the 35 
coefficients on size, profitability, board independence, audit quality, and geographical 
origin are significant.  These results clearly indicate that in Italy, firm-level incentives 
influence disclosure compliance.  We take special interest in the influence of the 
geographic origin on disclosure compliance, as it indicates that even within-country 
geographic regions matter for accounting information.  Results for Germany are also in 
line with our predictions, and the coefficients on size, board independence, audit quality, 
and early adoption of IFRS are significant, thus providing evidence of firm-level 
incentives driving disclosure compliance across German firms. 
Evidence from the pooled-sample analysis shows that coefficients on size, 
profitability, and growth are significantly more pronounced for Italy than for Germany.  
This result indicates that larger, growing, and more profitable firms generally tend to 
provide more forthcoming disclosures in Italy than in Germany.  The impact of high 
quality auditing on disclosure compliance also appears to be more pronounced in Italy, 
possibly because Italian audit firms tend to be more heterogeneous in terms of quality 
than German firms (Ashbaugh and Warfield 2003).  Interestingly, while for Italy we find 
a robust negative impact of the geographical region on disclosure compliance, we do not 
find a similar effect for Germany.  We take this finding as indicating that it is not the 
overall economic situation of a less developed region that drives differences in disclosure 
compliance; rather, the relationship-driven institutions that Southern Italy has developed 
over centuries (and that are unavailable in Eastern Germany) act as an alternative 
communication device for corporations.  Not surprisingly, German firms show overall 
higher disclosure compliance than Italian firms.  Based on the insight from the 
geographical region results, this finding might be driven by different cultural attitudes 36 
towards compliance in general.  Our findings are also in line with the common-held belief 
that Italian firms tend to “label adopt” IFRS without any serious commitment to 
transparency because, in a strong insider system like Italy, information asymmetries are 
mainly resolved via means other than publicly disclosing accounting information.   
Finally, our results show that early adopters provide better disclosure compliance than 
late adopters.  This result might be driven by learning curve effects or by omitted 
explanatory variables that influence the IFRS adoption decision as well as the incentives 
for disclosure compliance. 
Taken together, the tests of this section provide a rationale for the mixed findings 
of the previous sections on the comparability effects of mandatory IFRS adoption: even 
after adopting a harmonized set of accounting standards, accounting information 
continues to show cross-country as well as within-country heterogeneity  that can be 
predictably linked to country-, region-, and firm-level incentives that reduce the level of 
financial accounting information comparability.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In this study we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to an increase in 
cross-country comparability of accounting information.  Our analyses based on balance 
sheet line items indicate that comparability increases for other intangibles and provisions 
but not for goodwill.  In contrast, we find no clear impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
the within-industry comparability of earnings attributes across countries.  In a third set of 
tests we explore possible explanations for our mixed findings on the comparability effects 
of mandatory adoption: even under harmonized accounting standards, country-, region-, 
and firm-level factors lead to heterogeneous financial accounting information.  We 37 
therefore conclude that as long as countries’ infrastructures differ, market participants 
cannot expect fully comparable financial accounting information to obtain.  Rather, even 
when common accounting standards bring financial accounting information from 
different countries closer together, substantial differences remain.  However, these 
differences appear to be more prominent at the firm level than at the country level. 
Our results are subject to some important caveats.  First, they are based on a 
quasi-experiment: our “treatments” countries and clusters are not randomly assigned to 
our research subjects.  While we try to address this concern by using a difference-in-
differences approach and by constructing matched samples where feasible, these 
procedures nonetheless are likely to generate sub-optimal results.  Second, our 
measurement constructs are noisy and thus capture our economic dependent variable of 
interest (financial accounting information and its cross-sectional comparability) with 
error.  To improve the reliability of our findings, we try to increase the power of our 
statistical tests by conducting a battery of analyses designed to capture different aspects 
of our dependent variable. 
Third, with respect to external validity, we try to make our results as general as 
possible by drawing from a large sample of countries for our first two set of tests.   
However, this large sample evidence might give rise to internal validity concerns.  While 
we try to address these concerns by conducting an additional test that uses high quality 
hand-collected data, additional research using institutional expertise to investigate the 
effect of IFRS adoption on comparability in other jurisdictions using similar data seems 
warranted.   38 
Finally, it is important to note that comparability of financial accounting 
information as defined in this paper is neither good nor bad per se, and thus this paper 
does not take a stand on whether IRFS adoption improves the quality of financial 
accounting information.  Such a question is likely to be difficult to tackle absent an 
unambiguous measure of “financial accounting information quality.” 39 
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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY TO CALCULATE EARNINGS ATTRIBUTES 
 
This appendix presents the measurement of our seven earnings attributes which are used 
as dependent variables in our analyses. Our approach closely follows the methodology 
proposed by Francis et al. (2004) and uses the same set of seven earnings attributes. 
Francis et al. compute their earnings attributes as firm-specific time-series metrics. But, 
as we lack long enough time-series data (we have only three consecutive years of IFRS 
observations available (2006-2008)) and thus cannot estimate firm-specific time-series 
measures, we follow Leuz et al. (2003) and use a cross-sectional approach to measure our 
earnings attributes. We construct data cells based on country, year and industry (first digit 
SIC code based) and require for each cell at least ten observations to compute the 
respective earnings attribute metric. 
 
 
A.1 Accrual Quality 
 
Accrual quality is generally considered a synonymous of overall earnings quality. Since 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), this attribute is measured under the assumption that the role 
of accruals is to adjust the recognition of cash flows over time, and hence, the more 
accruals map into cash flow, the higher their quality. While we do not view accrual 
quality as a “quality” metric, we follow Dechow and Dichev’s model by estimating 
current accruals as a function of past, present, and future cash flows: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i CFO CFO CFO WCACC , 1 , 3 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,               (A1)
where: 
 
WCACCi,t =  total working capital accrual of firm i at time t (CAt - CLt - 
CASHt + STDEBTt), deflated by total assets 
CFOi,t  =  operating cash flow of firm i in year t (NIBEt - TAt),  
deflated by total assets 
NIBEi,t  =  net income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t;  
deflated by total assets 
TAi,t =  CAi,t - CLi,t - CASHi,t + STDEBTi,t - DEPi,t 
CAi,t  =  change in current assets of firm i between time t-1 and t 
CLi,t  =  change in current liabilities of firm i between time t-1 and t 
CASHi,t  =  change in cash of firm i between time t-1 and t 
STDEBTi,t  =  change in current debt of firm i between time t-1 and t 
DEPi,t  =  depreciation and amortization expense of firm i at time t 
 
We measure accrual quality as the standard deviation of estimated residuals from model 
(A1) multiplied by minus one (AQ = -(t)). High (low) values of AQ correspond to good 
(poor) accrual quality. 45 
A.2 Persistence 
 
Earnings persistence is regarded as a desirable attribute of earnings information because 
persistent earnings imply future sustainability. We measure the persistence of earnings 
with the slope coefficient (1) of the following autoregressive (AR1) model: 
 
t i t i t i NIBE NIBE , 1 , 1 0 ,          (A2)
 





Predictability relates to the way past earnings performance improves the ability of users 
to forecast future earnings patterns. We measure predictability as the square root of the 
error variance (- ) ( ,
2
t i   ) from model (A2) multiplied by minus one. Large (small) 





Although the desirability of earnings smoothness is controversial in the literature, several 
studies regard this property as positive since managers might smooth earnings to convey 
their private information about future earnings levels (Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Demski, 
1998). Our smoothness metric is calculated by the ratio of the standard deviation of net 
income before extraordinary items deflated by lagged total assets divided by the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations deflated by lagged total assets. The ratio is 
multiplied by minus one to ensure that high (low) values of this metric indicate high 





The theoretical rationale underlying earnings timeliness is that the role of accounting 
earnings is to track the change in the market value of equity (economic income). We 
measure timeliness as the R² from a “reverse regression” of earnings on returns: 
 




EARNi,t  =  net income before extraordinary items of firm i at time t, deflated by 
market value of equity of firm i at time t-1 
Ri,t  =  buy and hold return calculated over the fiscal year. 
NEGi,t  =  dummy variable that equals 1 if RET12i,t < 0 and 0 otherwise; 
 






As in the case of timeliness, also conservatism concerns the incorporation of publicly 
available information into accounting earnings. However, earnings conservatism focus on 
the differential “speed” in the recognition of bad versus good news. Following Basu 
(1997), we measure earnings conservatism as the incremental slope coefficient of 
negative returns (3) from model (A3). We delete observations with absolute values of 
the coefficient of one and larger. Also we require at least three firm-year observations 
with negative returns to estimate model A3. 
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A.7 Value Relevance 
 
The value relevance of earnings information relates to the ability of earnings to explain 
stock return variation. To measure the value relevance of earnings we follow the model 
proposed by Francis and Schipper (1999) and regress returns on the level and change in 
earnings: 
 




Ri,t  =  A 15-month buy and hold return of firm i ending three months after 
the fiscal year end of time t 
EARNi,t  =  net income before extraordinary items of firm i at time t, deflated by 
market value of equity of firm i at time t-1 
EARNi,t   =  Change in net income before extraordinary items of firm i between t 
and t-1 deflated by market value of equity of firm i at time t-1 
 
To capture the value relevance of earnings information, we take the R² of model (A4). 
Large (small) values imply more (less) value relevant earnings. 48 
APPENDIX 2: INSTRUMENT FOR IFRS COMPLIANCE TEST 
 
Applicability  Does the entity utilize share based payments? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Does the entity measure equity instruments at the fair value of goods or services 
received? 
Is there a general description of the nature and extent of share-based payment 
arrangements that existed during the period? 
Is there a description of how the fair value of the goods or services received, or 





Does the entity provide detailed information about the effect of share-based 
payment transactions on the entity's profit or loss for the period and on its 
financial position? 
Applicability  Does the entity have construction contracts? 
Measurement 
Compliance 
Does the entity provide initial recognition / subsequent measurement according to 
the percentage of completion method? 
Does the entity provide information about the amount of contract revenue 
recognised? 




Does the entity provide information about the method used to determine stage of 
completion? 
Applicability  Does the entity utilize lease contracts? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Are finance leases recorded as an asset and a liability at the lower of the fair 
value of the asset and the present value of the minimum lease payments? 
Is the carrying amount of asset disclosed? 
Does the entity provide a reconciliation between total minimum lease payments 




Does the entity provide information about the contingent rent recognised as an 
expense? 
Applicability  Is the standard applicable? 
Measurement 
compliance 
Are post employment benefits recognized as the net present value of the future 
final obligation (actuarial calculation)? 
Does the entity provide a general description of the post employment benefits 
plan? 
Does the entity provide a description of the methods utilized to calculate any 
actuarial gain or losses? 





Does the entity provide a reconciliation between the beginning of the period and 
the end of the period value of the obligation? 
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(APPENDIX 2 CONTINUED) 
 
Applicability  Is the standard applicable? 
Does the entity disclose basic EPS? 
Does the entity disclose diluted EPS? 
Does the entity disclose the amounts used as the numerators in calculating basic 
and diluted EPS, and a reconciliation of those amounts to profit or loss 
attributable to the parent entity for the period? 
IAS 33  Disclosure 
compliance 
Does the entity disclose the weighted average number of ordinary shares used as 
the denominator in calculating basic and diluted EPS, and a reconciliation of 
these denominators to each other? 
Applicability  Is the standard applicable? 
Does the entity calculate the recoverable amount as value in use or fair value less 
cost to sell?  Measurement 
compliance 
Does the entity perform an yearly impairment test for goodwill (if any)? 
If recoverable amount is value in use, is  the basis for determining value in use 
disclosed (cash flow projections, discount rate, etc.)? 
If recoverable amount is fair value less costs to sell, is  the basis for determining 




If the recoverable amount is not determined for each individual asset, does the 
entity provide information about cash generating units?  
Applicability  Does the entity present intangible assets in the balance sheet? 
Does the entity capitalize any of research costs, start-up costs, advertising costs?  Measurement 
compliance  Does the entity expense internally generated intangible assets? 
Is the useful life or amortisation rate disclosed? 
Is the amortisation method disclosed? 
IAS 38 
Disclosure 
compliance  Does the entity provide a reconciliation of the carrying amount at the beginning 
and the end of the period? 
Applicability  Is the standard applicable? 
Is fair value the initial recognition measurement basis for financial assets? 
Is amortized cost the measurement basis for held to maturity investments? 
Is fair value to equity the measurement basis for available for sale financial 
assets? 




Does the entity recognize derivatives on the balance sheet? 
Are methods and assumptions used in estimating fair values disclosed? 
Does the entity provide a description of the enterprise's financial risk 
management objectives and policies? 
IAS 39 
Disclosure 
compliance  Does the entity provide for each category of hedge (if any): A description of the 
hedge; which financial instruments are designated as hedging instruments; and 
the nature of the risks being hedged? 
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TABLE 1: LINE ITEMS TEST 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Line Items Sample 
 
Cluster of IFRS Adopting Countries     Cluster of Non-Adopting Countries 
   Pre 2005    Post 2005          Pre 2005    Post 2005    
Country Frequency  Percent    Frequency Percent Total Country Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent Total 
Australia   2,385  76.32    740 23.68 3,125 Argentina   50 83.33   10 16.67 60 
Austria   166  64.59    91 35.41 257 Brazil   64 53.33   56 46.67 120 
Belgium   291  67.36    141 32.64 432 Canada   425 62.59   254 37.41 679 
Denmark   189  67.5    91 32.5 280 Chile   210 79.55   54 20.45 264 
Finland   168  53.33    147 46.67 315 China   21 33.33   42 66.67 63 
France   1,806  64.62    989 35.38 2,795 India   557 49.91   559 50.09 1,116 
Germany   1,503  64.76    818 35.24 2,321 Indonesia   410 52.36   373 47.64 783 
Greece   318  59.44    217 40.56 535 Israel   111 81.02   26 18.98 137 
Hong Kong   198  48.29    212 51.71 410 Japan   3,243 64.28   1,802 35.72 5,045 
Ireland   39  38.24    63 61.76 102 Malaysia   793 66.58   398 33.42 1,191 
Italy   534  66.17    273 33.83 807 Mexico   44 61.11   28 38.89 72 
Netherlands   618  72.11    239 27.89 857 New Zealand   57 89.06   7 10.94 64 
Norway   380  65.4    201 34.6 581 Pakistan   125 86.21   20 13.79 145 
Peru   40  97.56    1 2.44 41 South Korea   470 97.31   13 2.69 483 
Philippines   43  18.45    190 81.55 233 Switzerland   168 88.89   21 11.11 189 
Poland   113  39.79    171 60.21 284 Taiwan   1,268 53.37   1,108 46.63 2,376 
Portugal   67  57.76    49 42.24 116 Thailand   84 43.08   111 56.92 195 
Singapore   196  57.82    143 42.18 339 Turkey   60 25.42   176 74.58 236 
South Africa   250  62.5    150 37.5 400            
Spain   271  72.65    102 27.35 373            
Sweden   630  68.4    291 31.6 921            
United Kingdom   1,648  58.03    1,192 41.97 2,840            
Total 11,853  64.54    6,511 35.46 18,364   Total  8,160 61.73   5,058 38.27 13,218 
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(TABLE 1 CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Within-industry Line item Heterogeneity by Country Cluster and Period 
 
σ (Line Items)  Country Cluster    Time Period  N  Mean  Median 
Pre 2005  223  0.043  0.035  Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  103  0.066***  0.057*** 





Post 2005  114  0.126***
,▼▼▼ 0.121***
,▼▼▼ 
Pre 2005  223  0.030  0.020  Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  103  0.046***  0.037*** 





Post 2005  114  0.080
▼▼▼ 0.079
▼▼▼ 
Pre 2005  223  0.015  0.011  Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  103  0.012*  0.010 











(TABLE 1 CONTINUED) 
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis 
 
  σ (GOODWILL)  σ (OTH_INTASS)  σ (PROVISIONS) 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)    Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2) 
Parameter  Estimate Pr>|t|  Estimate Pr>|t|  Estimate Pr>|t|     Estimate Pr>|t|  Estimate Pr>|t|  Estimate Pr>|t|
IFRS_ADOPT 0.061 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.055 0.000  0.050 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.036 0.000
POST_2005 0.020 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.018 0.000   0.014 0.004 -0.002 0.182 -0.003 0.151
IFRS_ADOPT*POST_2005 0.001 0.869 -0.002 0.748 -0.019 0.001  -0.018 0.005 -0.022 0.000 -0.021 0.000
μ (LOG(TOTASS))  -0.007 0.196   -0.001 0.808 0.004 0.069
μ (ROA)  0.006 0.886   -0.028 0.484 -0.009 0.565
μ (MTB)  0.000 0.643   0.000 0.213 0.000 0.401
μ (LEVERAGE)  0.089 0.007   -0.007 0.833 -0.057 0.000
μ (FREQ_LOSSES)  0.070 0.021   0.065 0.029 -0.008 0.481
σ (LOG(TOTASS))  -0.006 0.469   -0.008 0.289 0.005 0.132
σ (ROA)  0.041 0.043   0.044 0.030 -0.012 0.133
σ (MTB)  0.000 0.607   0.000 0.220 0.000 0.867
σ (LEVERAGE)  -0.083 0.030   -0.045 0.242 0.057 0.000
σ (FREQ_LOSSES)  -0.027 0.439   -0.043 0.219 -0.007 0.596
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes
Size fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes
n (R
2)  690 (0.643)   690 (0.657)   690 (0.497)    690 (0.515)   690 (0.653)   690 (0.669)
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(TABLE 1 CONTINUED) 
 
Notes: The analyses presented in this Table are based on the line items sample reported in Panel 
A contains 31,582 firm-year observations between 1998 and 2008 (excluding 2005) from 40 
countries (22 IFRS adopting and 18 non-adopting countries).  All firm-year observations of non-
adopting countries where firms voluntarily apply IFRS and all firm-year observations of 
voluntary adopters of IFRS adopting countries were deleted.  Also, firm-year observations are 
deleted if they do not have returns data from Datastream available, or if they lack any other data 
necessary for estimating the line item tests or earnings attributes tests.  Countries that mandate the 
adoption of IFRS in 2005 are grouped as the cluster of IFRS adopting countries, while the other 
countries are grouped under the cluster of non-adopting countries.  Each country cluster is split 
into two groups: (1) firm-year observations which cover the time span from 1998 to 2004 (Pre 
2005) and (2) firm-year observations which cover the time span from 2006 to 2008 (Post 2005).  
Panel B reports the distributions of the standard deviation of line items derived from subsamples 
partitioned by industry/year/size quintile (based on total assets) and tests for significant 
differences across both “Country Cluster” (IFRS Adopters versus Non-Adopters) and “Time 
Period” (Pre 2005 versus Post 2005).  In Panel B, GOODWILL is goodwill (Field 18280), 
divided by total assets (Field 02999). OTH_INTASS is intangible assets (Field 02649) net of 
goodwill, divided by total assets. PROVISIONS is provision for risk and charges (Field 03260) 
net of provisions for pension funds (Field 03261), divided by total assets.  σ() represents the 
within industry/year/size quintile standard deviation for the variable of interest .  A t-test 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test) is used to test for differences in means (medians). ***/**/* marks 
two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level across “Pre 2005” and “Post 2005” observations.  
▼▼▼/
▼▼/
▼ marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level across observations stemming from 
the cluster of IFRS adopting countries and the cluster of non-adopting countries.  In Panel C, 
IFRS_ADOPT is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective observation stems from a 
country which mandates the adoption of IFRS in 2005.  POST_2005 is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if the respective observation stems from a year subsequent 2005.   
LOG(TOTASS) is the natural logarithm of total assets.  ROA is return on assets calculated by 
dividing earnings before interest and taxes (Field 18191) by beginning of fiscal year total assets.  
MTB is market capitalization (Field 08001) divided by book value of equity (Field 03501).   
LEVERAGE is total debt (Field 03255) divided by total assets.  FREQ_LOSSES is frequency of 
losses defined as the proportion of previous five fiscal years that the firm reported negative 
earnings.  μ () represents the within industry/year/size quintile mean for the variable of interest 
.  All models in Panel C are estimated using ordinary least squares and industry and size quintile 
fixed effects.  All reported probabilities are two-sided. 54 
TABLE 2: EARNINGS ATTRIBUTES TEST 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Attributes Sample 
 
Cluster of IFRS Adopting Countries     Cluster of Non-Adopting Countries 
   Pre 2005    Post 2005          Pre 2005    Post 2005    
Country Frequency  Percent    Frequency Percent Total Country Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent Total 
Australia   4,225  53.35  3,695 46.65 7,920 Argentina   320 66.25 163 33.75 483 
Austria   273  59.48  186 40.52 459 Brazil   1,250 67.17 611 32.83 1,861 
Belgium   527  66.71  263 33.29 790 Canada   5,025 60.45 3,288 39.55 8,313 
Denmark   807  72.38  308 27.62 1,115 Chile   747 66.88 370 33.12 1,117 
Finland   724  67.92  342 32.08 1,066 China   2,642 39.4 4,063 60.6 6,705 
France   4,073  72.01  1,583 27.99 5,656 India   2,046 50.21 2,029 49.79 4,075 
Germany   2,535  60.57  1,650 39.43 4,185 Indonesia   1,236 67.28 601 32.72 1,837 
Greece   1,423  67.7  679 32.3 2,102 Israel   307 73.44 111 26.56 418 
Hong Kong   2,892  57.71  2,119 42.29 5,011 Japan   19,315 65.78 10,050 34.22 29,365 
Ireland   353  69.49  155 30.51 508 Malaysia   3,194 57.34 2,376 42.66 5,570 
Italy   1,128  64.68  616 35.32 1,744 Mexico   584 69.94 251 30.06 835 
Netherlands   893  71.27  360 28.73 1,253 New Zealand   405 77.44 118 22.56 523 
Norway   820  64.52  451 35.48 1,271 Pakistan   446 62.73 265 37.27 711 
Peru   314  63.82  178 36.18 492 South Korea   3,998 58.23 2,868 41.77 6,866 
Philippines   667  64.76  363 35.24 1,030 Switzerland   581 88.84 73 11.16 654 
Poland   404  40.04  605 59.96 1,009 Taiwan   3,812 52.85 3,401 47.15 7,213 
Portugal   380  73.5  137 26.5 517 Thailand   1,707 60.06 1,135 39.94 2,842 
Singapore   1,861  55.34  1,502 44.66 3,363 Turkey   743 60.31 489 39.69 1,232 
South Africa   1,709  73.44  618 26.56 2,327            
Spain   667  70.06  285 29.94 952            
Sweden   1,578  63.27  916 36.73 2,494            
United Kingdom   8,113  65.88    4,202 34.12 12,315            
Total   36,366  63.16    21,213 36.84 57,579   Total  48,358 59.98   32,262 40.02 80,620 55 
(TABLE 2 CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Within-industry Earnings Attribute Heterogeneity by Country Cluster and Period 
 
σ (Earnings Attributes)  Country Cluster  Time Period  N  Mean  Median 
Pre 2005  45 0.033 0.031 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  14 0.038 0.043 





Post 2005  14 0.045** 0.046** 
Pre 2005  44 0.310 0.312 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  21 0.263** 0.280** 
Pre 2005  48 0.295  0.287 
σ (PERS) 
IFRS Adopters 
Post 2005  21 0.244** 0.235** 
Pre 2005  44 0.091 0.065 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  21 0.139*** 0.134*** 
Pre 2005  48 0.076  0.069 
σ (PRED) 
IFRS Adopters 
Post 2005  21 0.113***
,▼▼ 0.111***
,▼
Pre 2005  46 0.238 0.228 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  21 0.212* 0.211* 
Pre 2005  49 0.233  0.230 
σ (SMOOTH) 
IFRS Adopters 
Post 2005  21 0.190*** 0.182*** 
Pre 2005  46 0.204 0.201 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  21 0.167** 0.158** 
Pre 2005  48 0.186  0.190 
σ (TIME) 
IFRS Adopters 
Post 2005  21 0.213**
,▼ 0.215**
,▼ 
Pre 2005  36 0.394 0.381 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  20 0.373 0.372 
Pre 2005  47 0.359  0.358 
σ (CONS) 
IFRS Adopters 
Post 2005  19 0.353 0.366 
Pre 2005  46 0.201  0.203 
Non-Adopters  
Post 2005  21 0.197  0.202 
Pre 2005  48 0.186  0.188 
σ (VR) 
IFRS Adopters 
Post 2005  21 0.207 0.207 
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(TABLE 2 CONTINUED) 
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis  
 
  σ (AQ)  σ (PERS) 
  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (3)    Model (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|     Estimate Pr > |t|
IFRS_ADOPT 0.004  0.049 0.006 0.277 -0.011 0.441    -0.031 0.415
POST_2005 0.005  0.153 0.005 0.224 -0.043 0.022    -0.029 0.297
IFRS_ADOPT*POST_2005 0.003  0.493 -0.004 0.440 -0.008 0.775   -0.024 0.483
μ (LOG(TOTASS))    0.005 0.431     -0.032 0.416
μ (ROA)    0.077 0.284     0.144 0.746
μ (MTB)    0.000 0.904     0.004 0.061
μ (LEVERAGE)    0.006 0.928     0.358 0.443
μ (FREQ_LOSSES)    0.086 0.081    -0.183 0.556
σ (LOG(TOTASS))    0.008 0.542    0.077 0.359
σ (ROA)    0.035 0.098    -0.040 0.766
σ (MTB)    0.000 0.851    0.000 0.315
σ (LEVERAGE)    0.053 0.419    0.132 0.765
σ (FREQ_LOSSES)    -0.063 0.376    0.231 0.620
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes
n (R
2)  121 (0.281)   121 (0.387)   134 (0.290)     134 (0.344)
 
 
  σ (PRED)  σ (SMOOTH) 
  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (3)    Model (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|     Estimate Pr > |t|
IFRS_ADOPT -0.017  0.012 -0.029 0.022 -0.003 0.792    -0.012 0.632
POST_2005 0.045  0.000 0.021 0.023 -0.023 0.067    -0.034 0.064
IFRS_ADOPT*POST_2005 -0.009  0.473 -0.028 0.013 -0.020 0.276   -0.017 0.476
μ (LOG(TOTASS))    0.040 0.003     0.035 0.178
μ (ROA)    0.252 0.086     0.223 0.438
μ (MTB)    0.002 0.032     -0.001 0.725
μ (LEVERAGE)    -0.342 0.027     -0.341 0.273
μ (FREQ_LOSSES)    0.195 0.058    -0.093 0.648
σ (LOG(TOTASS))    0.045 0.105    0.024 0.657
σ (ROA)    0.254 0.000    -0.031 0.721
σ (MTB)    0.000 0.348    0.000 0.933
σ (LEVERAGE)    0.029 0.841    -0.035 0.903
σ (FREQ_LOSSES)    -0.092 0.544    0.379 0.217
Industry fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes    Yes
n (R
2)  134 (0.573)   134 (0.796)   137 (0.209)     137 (0.290)
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(TABLE 2 CONTINUED) 
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis  
 
  σ (TIME)  σ (CONS) 
  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (3)    Model (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|     Estimate Pr > |t|
IFRS_ADOPT -0.018  0.112 -0.035 0.227 -0.031 0.161    0.037 0.484
POST_2005 -0.037  0.011 -0.040 0.065 -0.017 0.529    0.047 0.230
IFRS_ADOPT*POST_2005 0.064  0.002 0.072 0.010 0.014 0.710   -0.024 0.632
μ (LOG(TOTASS))    -0.024 0.440     -0.056 0.315
μ (ROA)    0.150 0.670     0.450 0.483
μ (MTB)    0.000 0.988     0.002 0.594
μ (LEVERAGE)    0.080 0.827     0.150 0.826
μ (FREQ_LOSSES)    -0.047 0.845    0.404 0.346
σ (LOG(TOTASS))    -0.002 0.980    -0.079 0.509
σ (ROA)    -0.014 0.892    -0.179 0.339
σ (MTB)    0.000 0.904    0.000 0.693
σ (LEVERAGE)    -0.226 0.501    1.701 0.008
σ (FREQ_LOSSES)    0.141 0.697    -0.178 0.792
Industry fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes    Yes
n (R
2)  136 (0.130)   136 (0.143)   122 (0.099)     122 (0.251)
 
 
  σ (VR)  σ (EA_ALL) 
  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (3)    Model (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|     Estimate Pr > |t|
IFRS_ADOPT -0.014  0.200 -0.049 0.080 -0.012 0.008    -0.019 0.105
POST_2005 -0.003  0.819 0.001 0.952 -0.011 0.082    -0.006 0.482
IFRS_ADOPT*POST_2005 0.024  0.234 -0.002 0.951 0.009 0.285   -0.005 0.635
μ (LOG(TOTASS))    0.016 0.577     0.000 0.970
μ (ROA)    0.467 0.168     0.293 0.040
μ (MTB)    0.001 0.480     0.001 0.070
μ (LEVERAGE)    0.312 0.374     0.046 0.756
μ (FREQ_LOSSES)    0.254 0.278    0.098 0.320
σ (LOG(TOTASS))    0.084 0.166    0.029 0.266
σ (ROA)    -0.027 0.784    0.002 0.958
σ (MTB)    0.000 0.807    0.000 0.584
σ (LEVERAGE)    -0.812 0.013    0.064 0.645
σ (FREQ_LOSSES)    0.057 0.869    0.075 0.613
Industry fixed effects    Yes Yes Yes    Yes
Earnings Attribute fixed effects  Yes    Yes
n (R
2)  136 (0.071)   136 (0.160)   920 (0.762)     920 (0.767)
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(TABLE 2 CONTINUED) 
 
Notes: The analyses presented in this Table are based on the earnings attributes sample reported 
in Panel A which contains 138,199 firm-year observations between 1998 and 2008 (excluding 
2005) from 40 countries (22 IFRS adopting and 18 non-adopting countries) which have more than 
100 public firms followed by Worldscope.  All firm-year observations of non-adopting countries 
where firms voluntarily apply IFRS and all firm-year observations of voluntary adopters of IFRS 
adopting countries were deleted.  Also, firm-year observations are deleted if they do not have 
returns data from Datastream available, or if they lack any other data necessary for estimating the 
earnings attributes tests or line item tests.  Countries that mandate the adoption of IFRS in 2005 
are grouped as the cluster of IFRS adopting countries, while the other countries are grouped under 
the cluster of non-adopting countries.  Each country cluster is split into two groups: (1) firm-year 
observations which cover the time span from 1998 to 2004 (Pre 2005) and (2) firm-year 
observations which cover the time span from 2006 to 2008 (Post 2005).  Panel B reports 
distributions of the standard deviation of earnings attributes derived from subsamples partitioned 
by country/industry/year and tests for significant differences across both “Country Cluster” (IFRS 
Adopters versus Non-adopters) and “Time Period” (Pre 2005 versus Post 2005).  Details of the 
calculation procedure for the earnings attributes can be inferred from Appendix 1.  AQ, PERS, 
PRED, SMOOTH, TIME, CONS and VR are respectively accrual quality, persistence, 
predictability, smoothness, timeliness, conservatism and value relevance.  EA_ALL represents a 
variable containing the standard deviations of all earnings attributes, yielding multiple 
observations for each bin (one for each attribute available).  σ() represents the within 
country/industry/year standard deviation for the variable of interest .  A t-test (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test) is used to test for differences in means (medians). ***/**/* marks two-sided 




marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level across observations stemming from the cluster 
of IFRS adopting countries and the cluster of non-adopting countries.  In Panel C, μ ( ) 
represents the within country/industry/year mean for the variable of interest .  All models in 
Panel C are estimated using ordinary least squares and industry fixed effects.  The model testing 
for the impact of IFRS adoption on the within industry variance of all earnings attributes together 
(σ (EA_ALL)) includes also earnings attributes fixed effects.  All other variables are as 
previously defined.  All reported probabilities are two-sided. 59 
TABLE 3: IFRS COMPLIANCE TESTS 
Panel A: Accounting Measurement Compliance 
Germany Late versus Italy 
   Germany Late    Italy         
Standard    n  Mean  Median  SD     n Mean Median SD   t-value  Z-score 
IFRS 2  15  1.000  1.000  0.000 67 0.925 1.000 0.265   1.09  1.07 
IAS 11  20  1.000  1.000  0.000 48 1.000 1.000 0.000 n/a  n/a 
IAS 17  75  0.987  1.000  0.115 125 0.992 1.000 0.089 -0.37  -0.36 
IAS 19  111  0.991  1.000  0.095 153 0.967 1.000 0.178 1.27  1.27 
IAS 36  120  0.950  1.000  0.176 153 0.964 1.000 0.153 -0.70  -0.78 
IAS 38  135  0.930  1.000  0.185 152 0.974 1.000 0.138 -2.30**  -2.81*** 
IAS 39  107  0.898  1.000  0.217   132 0.978 1.000 0.100   -3.77***  -3.90*** 
 
Germany Matched versus Italy 
   Germany Matched    Italy         
Standard    n  Mean  Median  SD     n Mean Median SD   t-value  Z-score 
IFRS 2  51  1.000  1.000  0.000 67 0.925 1.000 0.265   2.01**  1.98** 
IAS 11  29  1.000  1.000  0.000 48 1.000 1.000 0.000 n/a  n/a 
IAS 17  90  1.000  1.000  0.000 125 0.992 1.000 0.089 0.85  0.84 
IAS 19  110  0.991  1.000  0.095 153 0.967 1.000 0.178 1.26  1.26 
IAS 36  140  0.979  1.000  0.118 153 0.964 1.000 0.153  0.90 0.92 
IAS 38  151  0.950  1.000  0.161 152 0.974 1.000 0.138 -1.36  -1.83* 
IAS 39  121  0.936  1.000  0.149   132 0.978 1.000 0.100   -2.61***  -2.70*** 60 
(TABLE 3 CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Disclosure Compliance 
Germany Late versus Italy 
   Germany Late    Italy         
Standard    n  Mean  Median  SD     n Mean Median SD   t-value  Z-score 
IFRS 2  17  0.559  0.333  0.328 66 0.828 1.000 0.327   -3.03***  -3.23*** 
IAS 11  21  0.810  1.000  0.249 49 0.673 0.667 0.357 1.59  1.38 
IAS 17  120  0.772  1.000  0.343 125 0.613 0.667 0.370 3.48***  3.67*** 
IAS 19  121  0.607  0.750  0.318 153 0.657 0.750 0.320 -1.27  -1.49 
IAS 33  136  0.827  1.000  0.231 153 0.840 1.000 0.273 -0.42  -1.77* 
IAS 36  105  0.324  0.333  0.334 152 0.471 0.333 0.403 -3.09***  -2.88*** 
IAS 38  135  0.877  1.000  0.240 153 0.741 1.000 0.332 3.93***  3.58*** 
IAS 39  107  0.460  0.500  0.305   131 0.691 1.000 0.384   -5.06***  -5.35*** 
 
Germany Matched versus Italy 
   Germany Matched    Italy         
Standard    n  Mean  Median  SD     n Mean Median SD   t-value  Z-score 
IFRS 2  57  0.681  0.667  0.360 66 0.828 1.000 0.327   -2.37**  -2.66*** 
IAS 11  29  0.874  1.000  0.226 49 0.673 0.667 0.357 2.71***  2.62*** 
IAS 17  137  0.815  1.000  0.308 125 0.613 0.667 0.370 4.81***  4.83*** 
IAS 19  117  0.686  0.750  0.296 153 0.657 0.750 0.320 0.76  0.51 
IAS 33  153  0.887  1.000  0.209 153 0.840 1.000 0.273 1.71*  0.76 
IAS 36  125  0.517  0.667  0.418 152 0.471 0.333 0.403 0.93  0.81 
IAS 38  151  0.929  1.000  0.183 153 0.741 1.000 0.332 6.13***  5.60*** 
IAS 39  122  0.633  0.500  0.351   131 0.691 1.000 0.384   -1.26  -1.73* 
Notes: This Table reports average IFRS measurement and disclosure compliance scores (a value of 
one indicating full compliance) for the late adopters and matched German samples and for the 
Italian sample.  Firms included in these samples are at least listed since 2004 and have their 2006 
group financial reports available either on the respective investor relation section of the respective 
website or on the respective stock exchange website.  The instrument utilized to evaluate the IFRS 
measurement and disclosure compliance is available in Appendix 2.  SD stands for standard 
deviation.  A t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank test) is used to test for differences in means (medians). 
***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
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TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
German 2006 Sample (n=252) 
Variable  Mean SD 25 % Median  75 %
DSCORE 0.738 0.178  0.640 0.756  0.865
LOG(TOTASS) 12.060 2.037  10.704 11.816  13.037
ROA 0.020 0.137  -0.004 0.035  0.073
MTB 1.968 4.513  1.089 1.695  2.814
FREQ_LOSSES 0.342 0.334  0.000 0.200  0.600
INDEP_BOARD_D  0.591      
INSTOWN  0.361      
GOVOWN  0.048      
FAMBUS  0.194      
BIG4  0.563      
LD_REGION  0.067      
EARLY  0.460      
 
Italian 2006 Sample (n=153) 
Variable  Mean SD 25 % Median  75 %
DSCORE 0.678 0.227  0.522 0.700  0.870
LOG(TOTASS) 13.089 1.801  11.807 12.817  14.225
ROA 0.016 0.067  -0.012 0.020  0.049
MTB 2.324 2.822  1.314 1.837  2.615
FREQ_LOSSES  0.344      
INDEP_BOARD_D  0.392      
INSTOWN  0.386      
GOVOWN  0.137      
FAMBUS  0.601      
BIG4  0.863      
LD_REGION  0.033      62 
(TABLE 4 CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Correlations 
German 2006 Sample 
 A  B C D E F G H I J K L
A: DSCORE    0.328 -0.068 -0.022 0.035  0.259 -0.044 0.060 -0.094 0.293 0.005 0.424 
B: LOG(TOTASS)  0.300    0.163  0.082 -0.436 0.185 0.011 0.284  0.050 0.321 -0.085 0.084 
C: ROA  -0.055  0.140   0.166 -0.452  -0.035 0.035 0.044 0.037 -0.045 -0.076 -0.177 
D: MTB  0.100  0.154 0.181    -0.115 -0.042 0.050 0.019 -0.006 0.004 0.109 0.001 
E: FREQ_LOSSES  0.023  -0.459 -0.471  -0.073  -0.016 -0.031 -0.148 -0.161 -0.065 0.121 0.199 
F: INDEP_BOARD_D  0.266 0.175 0.032 0.116 -0.026    -0.030 0.072  -0.081 0.001 0.031 0.169 
G:  INSTOWN  -0.054  0.083 0.039 -0.043 -0.040 -0.030   -0.129 -0.369 0.129 -0.038 -0.147 
H: GOVOWN  0.049  0.233 0.040 0.086 -0.138  0.072 -0.129  -0.063 0.122 -0.060 0.018 
I: FAMBUS  -0.080  0.059 0.033  -0.047 -0.172  -0.081 -0.369 -0.063   -0.073 0.148 -0.051 
J: BIG4  0.300 0.308 -0.041 0.119 -0.053 0.001 0.129 0.122 -0.073   0.045 0.219 
K: LD_REGION  0.023  -0.098 -0.033  0.006 0.143  0.031 -0.038 -0.060  0.148 0.045  0.037 
L: EARLY  0.432  0.026 -0.106  0.147 0.185 0.169 -0.147 0.018 -0.051 0.219 0.037  
Italian 2006 Sample 
 A  B C D E F  G H I J K
A: DSCORE    0.462 0.283  0.112 -0.227 0.147  0.244 -0.042 0.071 0.302 -0.315
B: LOG(TOTASS)  0.439    0.222  -0.114 -0.412 0.072  0.204 0.324 -0.127 0.325 -0.122
C: ROA  0.284 0.311  0.040 -0.610 -0.157  0.206 0.065 0.153 0.127 -0.103
D: MTB  0.190  0.036 0.206   0.046 0.145  0.169 -0.012 -0.104 0.019 -0.015
E: FREQ_LOSSES  -0.199 -0.406 -0.714 -0.115  0.035  -0.119 -0.268 -0.138 -0.266 0.147
F: INDEP_BOARD_D  0.141  0.044 -0.089  0.139 0.036   0.106 0.146 -0.057 -0.108 0.003
G: INSTOWN  0.239 0.228 0.208 0.260 -0.122 0.106   -0.004 -0.041 0.160 -0.070
H: GOVOWN  -0.040  0.264 0.118 0.008 -0.269 0.146 -0.004   -0.490 0.159 0.034
I: FAMBUS  0.085  -0.079 0.135  -0.094 -0.148 -0.057  -0.041 -0.490  -0.092 -0.076
J: BIG4  0.281 0.343 0.161 0.034 -0.236 -0.108  0.160 0.159 -0.092  -0.034
K: LD_REGION  -0.270  -0.100 -0.098 -0.030 0.133 0.003 -0.070 0.034 -0.076 -0.034  63 
(TABLE 4 CONTINUED) 
Panel C: Multivariate Analyses  
   DSCORE 
   Model (5) 
   German Sample  Italian Sample    Pooled Sample 
Parameter 
Predicted 
Sign  Estimate  Pr > |t|   Estimate  Pr > |t|     Estimate  Pr > |t|
ITALY             -0.531 0.000
LOG(TOTASS) +  0.027 0.000   0.056 0.000    0.028 0.000
ITALY*LOG(TOTASS)             0.026 0.014
ROA +/- 0.005 0.955   0.801 0.005    0.009 0.916
ITALY*ROA             0.795 0.003
MTB +  -0.001 0.601   0.008 0.127    -0.001 0.637
ITALY*MTB             0.010 0.073
FREQ_LOSSES +  0.053 0.156   0.090 0.115    0.053 0.181
ITALY*FREQ_LOSSES             0.036 0.574
INDEP_BOARD_D +  0.052 0.010   0.083 0.011    0.055 0.011
ITALY*INDEP_BOARD_D            0.031 0.385
INSTOWN +/- -0.014 0.544   0.015 0.659    -0.019 0.434
ITALY*INSTOWN            0.043 0.254
GOVOWN +/- -0.041 0.414   -0.055 0.350    -0.019 0.716
ITALY*GOVOWN            -0.076 0.280
FAMBUS -  -0.034 0.219   0.007 0.859    -0.039 0.183
ITALY*FAMBUS            0.054 0.220
BIG4 +  0.047 0.035   0.140 0.003    0.048 0.037
ITALY*BIG4            0.088 0.063
LD_REGION -  0.018 0.653   -0.278 0.001    0.021 0.624
ITALY*LD_REGION            -0.306 0.000
EARLY +  0.104 0.000            0.111 0.000
Industry fixed effects    Yes Yes    Yes
n (R²)     252 (0.350)   153 (0.466)     405 (0.410)
Notes: The 2006 German and Italian samples contain observations from the full sample which fulfill 
the data requirements for estimating the models of Panel C.  In Panel C,  ITALY is a dummy variable 
coded one if the respective observation stems from an Italian firm and zero otherwise.   
%INDEP_BOARD_D is a dummy variable for board independence that, for the Italian sample is 
coded one if the number of independent directors divided by the total number of board members is 
above the full sample mean and zero otherwise, and, for the German sample is coded one if the head 
of the supervisory board has not been the former chief executive officer of the respective firm and 
zero otherwise.  INSTOWN is a dummy variable indicating significant institutional ownership in the 
firm.  GOVOWN is a dummy variable indicating whether a governmental body has a stake in the 
respective firm.  FAMBUS is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective firm is controlled 64 
by a managing family.  BIG4 is a dummy variable indicating whether the financial statements of the 
respective firm have been audited by a dominant audit supplier (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or 
PWC). LD_REGION is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective German (Italian) firm is 
domiciled in the eastern regions of Germany (southern regions of Italy).  EARLY is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm is an early or a late adopter of IFRS.  In Panel A, SD stands for 
Standard Deviation.  In Panel B Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.  
Bold typeset indicates two-sided significance below the 5 % level.  The models of Panel C are 




001  "Volatility Investing with Variance Swaps" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle and 
Elena Silyakova, January 2010. 
002  "Partial Linear Quantile Regression and Bootstrap Confidence Bands" by 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Ya’acov Ritov and Song Song, January 2010. 
003   "Uniform confidence bands for pricing kernels" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
Yarema Okhrin and Weining Wang, January 2010. 
004  "Bayesian Inference in a Stochastic Volatility Nelson-Siegel Model" by 
Nikolaus Hautsch and Fuyu Yang, January 2010. 
005   "The Impact of Macroeconomic News on Quote Adjustments, Noise, and 
Informational Volatility" by Nikolaus Hautsch, Dieter Hess and David 
Veredas, January 2010. 
006  "Bayesian Estimation and Model Selection in the Generalised Stochastic 
Unit Root Model" by Fuyu Yang and Roberto Leon-Gonzalez, January 
2010. 
007 "Two-sided  Certification: The market for Rating Agencies" by Erik R. 
Fasten and Dirk Hofmann, January 2010. 
008  "Characterising Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic 
Complementarities" by Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniels and Frank 
Heinemann, January 2010. 
009  "Predicting extreme VaR: Nonparametric quantile regression with 
refinements from extreme value theory" by Julia Schaumburg, February 
2010. 
010  "On Securitization, Market Completion and Equilibrium Risk Transfer" by 
Ulrich Horst, Traian A. Pirvu and Gonçalo Dos Reis, February 2010.  
011 "Illiquidity  and  Derivative Valuation" by Ulrich Horst and Felix Naujokat, 
February 2010. 
012  "Dynamic Systems of Social Interactions" by Ulrich Horst, February 
2010. 
013  "The dynamics of hourly electricity prices" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle and 
Stefan Trück, February 2010. 
014    "Crisis? What Crisis? Currency vs. Banking in the Financial Crisis of 
1931" by Albrecht Ritschl and Samad Sarferaz, February 2010. 
015   "Estimation of the characteristics of a Lévy process observed at arbitrary 
frequency" by Johanna Kappusl and Markus Reiß, February 2010. 
016    "Honey, I’ll Be Working Late Tonight. The Effect of Individual Work 
Routines on Leisure Time Synchronization of Couples" by Juliane 
Scheffel, February 2010. 
017    "The Impact of ICT Investments on the Relative Demand for High-
Medium-, and Low-Skilled Workers: Industry versus Country Analysis" 
by Dorothee Schneider, February 2010. 
018  "Time varying Hierarchical Archimedean Copulae" by Wolfgang Karl 
Härdle, Ostap Okhrin and Yarema Okhrin, February 2010. 
019  "Monetary Transmission Right from the Start: The (Dis)Connection 
Between the Money Market and the ECB’s Main Refinancing Rates" by 
Puriya Abbassi and Dieter Nautz, March 2010. 
020  "Aggregate Hazard Function in Price-Setting: A Bayesian Analysis Using 
Macro Data" by Fang Yao, March 2010. 
021  "Nonparametric Estimation of Risk-Neutral Densities" by Maria Grith, 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle and Melanie Schienle, March 2010. 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
  
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
022 "Fitting  high-dimensional Copulae to Data" by Ostap Okhrin, April 2010. 
023  "The (In)stability of Money Demand in the Euro Area: Lessons from a 
Cross-Country Analysis" by Dieter Nautz and Ulrike Rondorf, April 2010.   
024  "The optimal industry structure in a vertically related market" by 
Raffaele Fiocco, April 2010. 
025  "Herding of Institutional Traders" by Stephanie Kremer, April 2010. 
026  "Non-Gaussian Component Analysis: New Ideas, New Proofs, New 
Applications" by Vladimir Panov, May 2010. 
027  "Liquidity and Capital Requirements and the Probability of Bank Failure" 
by Philipp Johann König, May 2010. 
028  "Social Relationships and Trust" by Christine Binzel and Dietmar Fehr, 
May 2010. 
029  "Adaptive Interest Rate Modelling" by Mengmeng Guo and Wolfgang Karl 
Härdle, May 2010. 
030  "Can the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Explain Inflation Gap 
Persistence?" by Fang Yao, June 2010. 
031  "Modeling Asset Prices" by James E. Gentle and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
June 2010. 
032  "Learning Machines Supporting Bankruptcy Prediction" by Wolfgang Karl 
Härdle, Rouslan Moro and Linda Hoffmann, June 2010. 
033  "Sensitivity of risk measures with respect to the normal approximation 
of total claim distributions" by Volker Krätschmer and Henryk Zähle, 
June 2010. 
034  "Sociodemographic, Economic, and Psychological Drivers of the Demand 
for Life Insurance: Evidence from the German Retirement Income Act" 
by Carolin Hecht and Katja Hanewald, July 2010. 
035  "Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design" by 
Ulrich Horst and Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, July 2010. 
036  "Why Do Financial Market Experts Misperceive Future Monetary Policy 
Decisions?" by Sandra Schmidt and Dieter Nautz, July 2010. 
037  "Dynamical systems forced by shot noise as a new paradigm in the 
interest rate modeling" by Alexander L. Baranovski, July 2010. 
038  "Pre-Averaging Based Estimation of Quadratic Variation in the Presence 
of Noise and Jumps: Theory, Implementation, and Empirical Evidence" 
by Nikolaus Hautsch and Mark Podolskij, July 2010. 
039  "High Dimensional Nonstationary Time Series Modelling with Generalized 
Dynamic Semiparametric Factor Model" by Song Song, Wolfgang K. 
Härdle, and Ya'acov Ritov, July 2010. 
040 "Stochastic  Mortality,  Subjective  Survival Expectations, and Individual 
Saving Behavior" by Thomas Post and Katja Hanewald, July 2010. 
041  "Prognose mit nichtparametrischen Verfahren" by Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 
Rainer Schulz, and Weining Wang, August 2010. 
042  "Payroll Taxes, Social Insurance and Business Cycles" by Michael C. 
Burda and Mark Weder, August 2010. 
043  "Meteorological forecasts and the pricing of weather derivatives" by 
Matthias Ritter, Oliver Mußhoff, and Martin Odening, September 2010. 
044  "The High Sensitivity of Employment to Agency Costs: The Relevance of 
Wage Rigidity" by Atanas Hristov, September 2010. 
045  "Parametric estimation of risk neutral density functions" by Maria Grith 
and Volker Krätschmer, September 2010. 
   SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2010 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
046  "Mandatory IFRS adoption and accounting comparability" by Stefano 
Cascino and Joachim Gassen, October 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 